To understand policy-motivated behavior of Supreme Court justices it is necessary to measure their policy preferences. To date, most scholars have assumed the policy preferences of Supreme Court justices remain consistent throughout the course of their careers, and most measures of judicial ideology -such as Segal and Cover (1989) scores -are time invariant. This assumption is facially valid; Supreme Court justices serve with life tenure, and are typically appointed after serving in other political or judicial roles. However, it also possible that the world views, and thus policy preferences, of justices evolve through the course of their careers. In this paper we use a Bayesian dynamic ideal point model to investigate preference change on the Supreme Court that allows for justices' ideal points to change over time in any smooth fashion. We focus our attention on the sixteen justices who served for ten or more terms and completed their service between 1937 and the present. The results are striking -fourteen of these sixteen justices exhibit significant preference change.
Introduction
Do the revealed preferences of Supreme Court justices change over time?
1 The answer to this question has broad implications, both for our understanding of the Supreme Court, and the manner in which scholars measure the ideal points of justices. If the assumption of preference stability does not hold, then the findings of all studies which rely on constant measures of preferences may be called into question. But for the study of in The
Journal of Politics, no systematic empirical analysis has determined the extent to which judicial preferences change over time.
In this paper we employ a Bayesian dynamic ideal point model developed by Martin and Quinn (2002) to estimate revealed preferences for all Supreme Court justices serving between 1937 and 2000. This model allows us to estimate ideal points that are on a comparable metric over time, and also permits a wide range of smooth dynamics in ideal points. Further, since these ideal point estimates are based on a statistical measurement model, we can gauge uncertainty of the estimates and other quantities of interest. We use the results from this model to demonstrate that the revealed preferences of Supreme Court justices are far from stable.
We begin this note by reviewing the literature, and arguing that the 1 Throughout this note we use the terms preferences and ideal points interchangeably to mean revealed preferences. That is, the preferences defined in an issue space revealed through the votes of the justices (Epstein and Mershon, 1996) . It is important to note that this notion of revealed policy preferences is conceptually very different from personal policy preferences, or attitudes (Segal and Spaeth, 1993) . The revealed preferences that we estimate on a policy scale are likely caused by any number of factors, including personal attitudes, the decision context, and so forth. The purpose of this paper is to document change in revealed preferences; we leave explaining change for future research.
2 study has methodological flaws which limit its ability to uncover preference change. We then discuss the measurement model we employ, highlighting its ability to estimate preferences while controlling for changes in case stimuli. In Section 4, we discuss research design, and present the evidence for preference change. The final section concludes.
A Methodological Critique of the Literature
Personal policy preferences, or attitudes, are key explanatory variables in attitudinal accounts of judicial behavior (Segal and Spaeth, 1993) . If the attitudinal model is true, then the revealed preferences (or ideal points) of the the justices will correspond to their attitudes.
On the other hand, strategic accounts of Supreme Court decision making use preferences as building blocks for explaining interdependent behavior. Regardless of the theoretical approach, summarize the prevailing wisdom in the study of judicial behavior: " [t] he occasional anomaly notwithstanding, most jurists evince consistent voting behavior over the course of their careers" (p. 801).
The Assumption of Constant Preferences
The attitudinal model (Schubert, 1974; Rohde and Spaeth, 1976; Segal and Spaeth, 1993) asserts that justices have personal attitudes, and that cases provide stimuli material from which justices make decisions. The model does not explicitly assume that attitudes are fixed. However, nearly all empirical work related to the attitudinal model employs constant measures of attitudes. The most commonly used measures are Segal and Cover (1989) scores, which are based on newspaper editorials at the time of confirmation. Others use measures such as the party identification of the justice (George and Epstein, 1992) , or measures of social background (Tate, 1981) . In some areas, such as civil rights and civil liberties, these time invariant measures are shown to be quite successful in explaining votes, but in others, like economics and federalism cases, their performance is suspect (Epstein and Mershon, 1996) .
3
An alternative explanation of behavior -the strategic model (Eskridge, 1991; Epstein and Knight, 1998) -asserts that justices have policy preferences, and pursue their preferences in an interdependent choice situation. While, this model does not necessarily assert that preferences are constant, nearly all empirical work employs measures where this is the case, most notably Eskridge (1991) and Segal (1997) who use Segal and Cover (1989) scores, and Spiller and Gely (1992) who use the party of the appointing president.
The key point to take from the literature is that the assumption of constant preferences in not a theoretical one per se, but rather is chosen for empirical convenience. It is somewhat surprising, then, that little systematic research has been conducted to determine whether or not the assumption is consistent with the data. The anecdotal evidence suggests that preference change sometimes occurs (see, for example Ulmer, 1981; Atkins and Sloope, 1986, as well as accounts in the law reviews and popular press). And, there is evidence that justices oftentimes change their behavior between preliminary conference votes and votes on the merits (Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 1996) . This reveals that justices are amenable to pressure from other justices, and that there are factors besides policy preferences that are determinants of the vote.
These anecdotal accounts are suggestive, but to draw definite conclusions it is necessary to systematically study the behavior of many justices over time. The first do so was Baum (1988) , who was primarily interested in policy change on the Court. While he claims there may be some preference change, he concludes that case stimuli, not preference change, are what explain the observed dynamics. In the only study with the goal of assessing of preference change, look at all sixteen justices who served ten or more terms and served their entire career between 1937 and 1993. They contend that it is vital to look at justices who have served for a long period of time, and to only look at justices who have completed their entire service in the time period (otherwise, one could underestimate the number of justices who demonstrated significant preference change). To measure prefer-4 ences, they contend that votes are the best place to look (Epstein and Mershon, 1996) , and they use the Baum-corrected (1988) percent liberal civil liberties as their measure of policy preferences. Given this measure, they use linear, quadratic and cubic regression models to assess significance. They find that seven justices exhibit no significant preference change (Brennan, Burger, Burton, Harlan, Jackson, Marshall, Stewart), four exhibit linear trends (Blackmun, Clark, Reed, and White), and five exhibit nonlinear change (Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Powell, and Warren). Their conclusion is that preference change is significant, and that it should be accounted for in future studies. But this study is predicated on the use of the Baum correction. On face, this seems problematic, as Baum (1988) notes that one of the three assumptions on which his method is based is: "each justice's ideal point on the civil liberties dimension remains constant throughout the justice's career " (p. 907, emphasis added).
Estimating Ideal Points from Vote Data
To illustrate the Baum correction, and to highlight the fundamental problem of ideal point estimation, consider the following hypothetical justice. Assume that a Supreme Court justice is hearing two statutory cases from different states regarding the length of time a prisoner can be held and questioned before being brought before a magistrate. Further assume that the federal law states that unless states adopt another "reasonable" standard, prisoners must be brought before a judge within twenty-four hours of incarceration. But for these state laws that are being reviewed, the status quo would be determined by the federal prescription of twenty-four hours. Further suppose that the hypothetical justice has an preferred policy of forty hours. With the precise information about the ideal point of the justice and the substantive content of the cases, it is easy to employ the logic of spatial voting to generate predictions about behavior (Enelow and Hinich, 1984) . However, when estimating ideal points from data, we typically only observe the votes cast by individual justices.
2 The fundamental problem of ideal point estimation is simultaneously estimating these ideal points and the characteristics of the cases being considered (also know as the case parameters). The manner in which this problem is resolved statistically is by recognizing that when given a set of case characteristics, one can recover the set of best-fitting ideal points. And when given a set of ideal points, one can recover the set of best-fitting case characteristics. These can be done simultaneously when these two parts are tied together in a statistical model (Clinton et al., 2000; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) .
In our example, given the case parameters and the two votes on the cases, we can infer that our hypothetical justice's ideal point must fall between thirty-six and forty-eight. The 
The Baum Correction
The Baum (1988) correction is the tool employ to tie together estimates of ideal points throughout time. To formalize the problem of dynamic ideal point estimation, let θ t,j ∈ R denote the ideal point or policy preference of justice j in term t. Furthermore,
k ∈ R denote the location of the liberal policy alternative for case k, and x (r) k ∈ R denote the conservative policy alternative for case k. These two case parameters contain the information about the policy content of each case. The midpoint between these two policy
k )/2 (also called the indifference point) determines the manner in which the justice votes.
3 If, for example, and
k , then those to left of the midpoint will vote for the liberal option, and those to the right will vote for the conservative one.
Figure 1 contains an illustration of two hypothetical configurations of preferences in terms
3 The midpoint is determinative under the assumption of symmetric utility functions, such as with the commonly used quadratic utility function (Enelow and Hinich, 1984) , or a Gaussian utility function (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) t − 1 and t for nine justices. In the top line of the figure in term t − 1 the midpoint falls between Justice 5 and 6. In the second line, the location of the midpoint has changed, and now falls between Justice 3 and 4. Notice that in the figure the preferences remain the same, but the observed vote would change (it would be 5-4 in the first case, and 6-3 in the second). Thus, computing a raw average across a set of cases could be misleading unless the changes in case stimuli are controlled for. Baum recognizes this fact, and offers a correction to account for it. In his case, between two natural Courts (or, for Epstein et al.
(1998) between terms), one computes the median change in the percent liberalism for each justice across all justices (formally, med j {θ t,j −θ t−1,j }), whereθ t,j is the estimated ideal point, in this case computed as the percent liberal in civil liberties cases. This is the Baum correction to then be subtracted from each justice's estimated ideal pointθ t,j to control for changes in case stimuli. The Baum correction thus solves the problem of dynamic ideal point estimation by assuming that preferences are fixed, and that any dynamics are solely in the case parameters.
As Baum notes, this correction is only appropriate if preferences are constant. Indeed, by inspecting Figure 1 it is clear that if preferences were also allowed to move, it would be impossible to determine whether the derived correction was explained by changes in the case stimuli or changes in preferences. The two are in fact conflated. Observed changes in Baum-corrected percent liberalism measures will tell us that something changed (either the ideal points or the case parameters) but it cannot tell us which changed. Moreover, there is no justification for using the median change as the correction. Clearly the median justice does not always prevail on the Supreme Court, as we observe many votes of 6 − 3, 7 − 2, and so forth. Thus, the results of the (Clinton et al., 2000) . This model, which we call a constant ideal point model, assumes that ideal points are time invariant. Martin and Quinn (2002) extend this model, and propose a dynamic ideal point model which allows for preferences to change over time. Conceptually this model estimates all of the case parameters from a distribution common to all terms, and an ideal point for each justice in each term on a comparable metric across terms. The model is formalized as follows.
Let K t ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , K} denote the set of cases heard by the Supreme Court in term t, and
. . , J} denote the set of justices who heard case k. The cardinality of |J k | denotes the number of justices sitting on a case k, which is typically nine, but fewer in certain cases.
We are interested in modeling the decisions made in terms t = 1, . . . , T on cases k ∈ K t by justices j ∈ J k in a uni-dimensional issue space. We code all votes in term t on case k by are handful of reasons to suspect that the judicial policy space from 1937 to 2000 is unidimensional. Using multidimensional scaling techniques, Grofman and Brazill (2002) show that between 1953 and 1991 a single dimension best explains Supreme Court decision making.
To assess dimensionality throughout the time period of our study, we have computed the eigenvalues of double-centered agreement matrix for each term. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) suggest that if number of eigenvalues greater than one are suggestive of the true underlying dimensionality. For every term, the second eigenvalue is less than one, which suggests a uni-dimensional model is appropriate (these supplemental results are available in the web appendix). Moreover, the policy dimension we estimate is highly correlated with the many (non-orthogonal) scales uncovered by Schubert (1974) and Rohde and Spaeth (1976) . This evidence, along with the model fit discussed below, justifies these simplifying assumptions.
justice j as either being in favor of the conservative option (v t,k,j = 1) or the liberal option (v t,k,j = 0). The observed data matrix V is thus a (K × J) matrix of votes and missing values.
The spatial model suggests that the ideal points of the justices θ t,j for the j th justice in term t, and the case stimuli x (l)
k and x (r) k , determine votes on the merits. These are the quantities we wish to estimate from the data. To do so, let z t,k,j denote a latent random utility which explains the votes on the merits:
The spatial model suggests that (Clinton et al., 2000; Martin and Quinn, 2002) :
Where ε t,k,j is a random error term, which we assume is homoscedastic with known variance.
The two case parameters α k and β k characterize the case stimuli. In fact, the ratio −α k /β k is the estimate of the midpoint between x (l)
k and x (r) k . And, the estimate of the ideal point for justice j in term t is θ t,j . This model differs from that standard two-parameter item response model in that these ideal points are allowed to change over time.
To complete the model it is necessary to assign prior distributions to all parameters. We begin by assuming standard Gaussian prior distributions for the case parameters:
The Martin and Quinn (2002) model departs from the standard approach in the prior distribution over the ideal points. We assume that the ideal points follow a random walk process.
This allows for preference change of all sorts. We model these dynamics with a separate random walk prior for each justice:
. . , T j and justice j on the Court ,
where T j is the first term justice j served, and T j is the last term j served. We do not estimate ideal points for terms in which a justice did not serve. ∆ θ t,j is an evolution variance parameter which is fixed a priori by the researcher. Its magnitude parameterizes how much borrowing of strength (or smoothing) takes place from one time period to the next. Note that if ∆ θ t,j = 0 this would be the same as assuming fixed ideal points. At the other extreme, as ∆ θ t,j → ∞ we get a model in which the ideal points are temporally independent. To complete the prior, we must anchor each time series at the unobserved time period zero.
Here, in a slight abuse of notation, we let 0 denote time period T j − 1 for all j. We assume that:
To estimate this model, we adopt the strategy of Martin and Quinn (2002) , which is based on standard item response theory (Albert, 1992; Bock and Lieberman, 1970; Bradlow et al., 2000; Hambleton and Swaminathan, 1985) and Bayesian dynamic linear models (West and Harrison, 1997) .
Note that this random walk prior is a solution to the fundamental problem of dynamic ideal point estimation. It ensures that ideal points and case parameters are measured on the same metric throughout time. This prior provides the necessary distributional assumption to keep ideal points on the same metric while also allowing for smooth changes across time.
Before we turn to our specific application, it is important to recognize some additional properties of this model. First, this is a fully parameterized statistical model, which not only solves the fundamental problem of ideal point estimation, but allows us to report measures of uncertainty for all quantities of interest. Second, this approach does not conflate possible 12 changes in case stimuli and idea points. Both are estimated separately in the model: the case parameters α k and β k are the estimates of the case stimuli, and the θ t,j are the ideal point estimates in each term. Third, this model allows for ideal points to change over time. The use of the random walk prior allows for change to take an extremely wide range of smooth forms, and is much more flexible than assuming linear or polynomial change, such as the D-NOMINATE model of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) .
The Evidence for Preference Change, 1937-2000
To make our results comparable to , and due to data availability, we 6 The unit of analysis is the case citation (ANALU=0). We select cases where the type of decision (DEC TYPE) equals 1 (orally argued cases with signed opinions), 5 (cases with an equally divided vote), 6 (orally argued per curiam cases), or 7 (judgements of the Court), and drop all unanimous cases. As discussed by Martin and Quinn (2002) , dropping unanimous cases does not impact estimation of ideal points or case parameters because these cases do not contribute to the likelihood. For comparability with and across the three data sources, we code all votes as either liberal or conservative. The coding protocol is arbitrary; one would obtain identical ideal point estimates if all votes were coded affirm or reverse, minority or majority, etc.
To ensure a common scale for the ideal points across time, it is necessary to assign informative priors for justices that span the entire length of the study. In our case, we set the prior mean for the ideal points m 0,j to zero for all justices except Black, Stewart, and Rehnquist, with prior means −2.0, 1.0, and 3.0 respectively. The prior variances C j,0 were set to one for all justices but for these three. Note that this prior is only on the first term in which the justice served. For all other terms, the ideal point in the previous term serves as the prior mean. To complete the prior we set the evolution variance ∆ θ t,j = 0.1 for all justices in all terms after their first. 7 We simulate from the posterior distribution of this model using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods (Jackman, 2000; Gill, 2002) . These methods allow one to simulate from a distribution that is otherwise computationally intractable. 8 To simulate from values have to be employed to solve rotational invariance). Second, the results look quite similar for other evolution variances. We have fit models with ∆ θ t,j = 0.01, ∆ θ t,j = 0.25, ∆ θ t,j = 0.5, and ∆ θ t,j = 3.0 and find nearly identical results. This implies that regardless of the amount of smoothing, many justices exhibit preference change.
Bayesian methods in the context of ideal point estimation; see Jackman (2001) for a review.
Due to the large number of parameters, maximum likelihood inference for our dynamic ideal point model would be intractable.
Our main quantity of interest is the ideal points of the justices. Due to space considerations, we only report the ideal point estimates of the sixteen justices considered. These justices are chosen because they served for ten or more terms (thus allow- How well does the model fit? In short, quite well. In particular, these results correlate highly with percent liberalism in civil rights, civil liberties, economics, and federalism cases (Martin and Quinn, 2002) . This is surprising, as most existing measures only fare well for civil rights and civil liberties cases (Epstein and Mershon, 1996) . Additionally, the model has solid explanatory power. Overall, the model correctly classifies 75.7% of the votes. is also important not to rely on global models of change, such as linear regression models.
In fact, the probability of interest is the posterior probability that a particular justice is more conservative in subsequent terms than in a baseline term. As Hagle (1993) notes, justices learn a great deal during their first term of service. Maltzman and Wahlbeck (1996) also show that justices are amenable to persuasion early in their careers. This implies it is not a terribly reliable baseline. For our first comparison, we take the mean ideal point of each justice's second, third, and fourth terms of service as the baseline for comparison (θ * j ).
Then, for all subsequent terms, we compute the posterior probability that the justice is more conservative than the baseline:
Notice that by computing the probabilities in this fashion, we account for all parameter uncertainty in these estimates. For each of the sixteen justices, we plot these posterior probabilities in Figure 4 . Each cell of the figure contains dotted lines at the 2.5 th and the 97.5 th percentiles. If the estimated probability is greater than the 97.5 th percentile, then it does show that the assumptions on which this spatial model are based are reasonable.
we can conclude that the justice was significantly more conservative in that term. If the estimated probability is less than the 2.5 th percentile, we can conclude that the justice was significantly more liberal in that term than in the baseline term.
The results in Figure 4 are striking. Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Harlan, Jackson, Reed, and White are significantly more conservative in some subsequent terms than the baseline. Justices Blackmum, Brennan, Burger, Clark, Douglas, Harlan, Marshall, Powell, and Warren are significantly more liberal in some subsequent terms. Justices Douglas and
Harlan are significantly more conservative than the baseline in some subsequent terms and significantly more liberal than the baseline in other subsequent terms. This is consistent with the parabolic trajectories in Figure 2 . But the patterns are quite different, as Harlan is only significantly more liberal in his final term than the baseline, while Douglas is significantly more liberal for well over his final decade. Another interesting pattern is White, who is significantly more conservative than the baseline for two periods. This confirms the bimodality demonstrated in Figure 2 . Only two justices -Burton and Stewart -demonstrate no significant change in their ideal points, even after controlling for changes in case stimuli. 11 The implication is clear - underestimate the amount of preference change on the Supreme Court. And, their conclusion that Brennan, Burger, Harlan, Jackson, and Marshall exhibit no significant change is incorrect. This is likely due to their measurement strategy, and using only a global test of preference change. Indeed, our results for Harlan, Douglas, and White show that assuming a particular functional form, either linear or parabolic, for ideal points trajectories is an inappropriate assumption. The findings for these justices would be masked (as with Harlan), or attenuated (as with Douglas and White) using a global measure.
Instead of imposing a particular baseline for comparison, we present further evidence of preference change in Figure 5 . To construct this figure, we compute the posterior probability that a given justice is more conservative in term r than term s for all possible combinations where r > s. That is:
Pr(θ r,j > θ s,j ) for s = 1, ..., T j − 1, r = 2, ..., T j , and r > s.
We summarize these posterior probability profiles for four justices of interest in Figure 5 The findings from these results are striking -preference change is a common phenomenon that occurs quite often on the Supreme Court.
Implications and Conclusion
These results call into question the assumption that the preferences of Supreme Court justices remain constant throughout the course of their careers. This is important to two crucial respects. First, if other scholars employ preference measures that are constant across time, such as Segal and Cover (1989) scores, the independent variable capturing preferences will be measured with systematic error. It is well know that this can lead to bias in the estimation of structural parameters of interest, and can lead to incorrect conclusions about the area of interest. In principle, this bias can not only lead to coefficients that are attenuated toward zero, but can also cause changes in the signs of coefficients. Practically, when analyzing a single cross section of data, this measurement error will be of little consequence. But when studying Supreme Court behavior over time, using time invariant preference measures can lead to incorrect conclusions about the effect of preferences or other variables on the outcome of interest. Most statistical studies of judicial behavior look at behavior over time (e.g. Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 1996; Segal and Cover, 1989) , which implies that this is a serious concern.
Second, the most commonly used measure of judicial preferences, Segal and Cover (1989) scores, are time invariant. These measure have the advantage of being truly exogenous from behavior, but the results presented here demonstrate that the assumption of constancy is inappropriate. Epstein and Mershon (1996) demonstrate that the explanatory power of Segal and Cover (1989) scores is limited to civil rights and liberties issues, and that the scores should only be used to study aggregated votes for those issue areas. Or results go a step further; Segal and Cover (1989) should not be used to study judicial behavior that occurs 20 over time. Other measures, such as party identification of the justices or social background characteristics suffer the same ills.
What is the solution to this problem? One important by-product of our research is that we estimate an ideal point for every justice in every term for all justices serving between 1937 and 2000. These measures are available in electronic form on the web appendix. Our measures are time-varying, and thus do not suffer from the deficiency of other commonly used measures. When studying any phenomenon expect votes on the merits, these measures can be employed as independent variables to explain behavior. However, our measures cannot directly be used to study votes on the merits, because votes were used to construct the measures. There is a solution to this problem. As Martin and Quinn (2002) 
This model has the property that if it is correctly specified (which is an assumption implicitly made about every statistical model), then one can simultaneously estimate structural parameters and ideal points, thus avoiding the endogeneity problem. The estimated γ parameters are simply probit coefficients, and the recovered θ t,j parameters are the ideal points for each justice. This model can also be estimated using MCMC methods (Martin and Quinn, 2002) .
One important question that we leave for future research is what explains preference change? The results clearly show that justices exhibit change in revealed preferences over
time. Yet, to our knowledge, there exists no literature that theoretically addresses ideal point change among Supreme Court justices. There are many promising avenues for theorizing.
One literature to consider is the social-psychological literature on attitude change (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) , which might provide some leverage on the problem. Some of the first 21 term effects documented by Hagle (1993) might be due to some of these factors. We know a great deal about the social background of the justices (Tate, 1981) , and some of these variables might capture some of these psychological phenomenon. This approach dovetails very nicely with the behavioral theories of judicial behavior Rohde and Spaeth (1976); Schubert (1974) . It also might be the case that strategic considerations are what explain preference change (Epstein and Knight, 1998) . The logic is simple. In some circumstances, such as with a conservative President and liberal Congress, the Supreme Court is unconstrained, and can thus sincerely write their policy preferences into law. In other circumstances, such as a conservative Court facing a liberal executive and legislative branch, the Court will be constrained, and thus create policy more moderate than they would otherwise (Eskridge, 1991; Segal, 1997) . This strategic behavior will manifest itself in case parameters and ideal points. But inter-institutional politics are not the only locus for strategic behavior; considering intra-institutional politics might also be fruitful (Maltzman and Wahlbeck, 1996) .
Finally, the macro-political context might contribute to preference change. To pursue this line of inquiry, it is necessary to synthesize these theories, develop measures to sort out these competing explanations, and specify additional statistical models.
At the end of the day, this note contributes to the judicial politics literature in a number of ways. The dynamic ideal point model an extremely flexible model with respect to ideal point dynamics. By minimal structure on the trajectory of ideal points, the data demonstrates that nearly every justice exhibits statistically significant preference change over the course of their careers. The patterns uncovered by the model are substantively interesting, and facially valid. Moreover, this simple uni-dimensional model accounts for a great deal of the variance in votes on the merits over a long time period. We also provide a measure of revealed preferences that other scholars can use in their research. Yet, the case is not closed on the phenomenon of preference change among Supreme Court justices; more theoretical and empirical work needs to take place to explain this empirical regularity. (x l + x r )/2
Figure 1: An illustration of policy change (Baum, 1988) and the spatial voting model. 27 
